

# **THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT OF POWER IN SMALL WARS: The Case of El Salvador**

A Monograph  
By  
Major Bobby Ray Pinkston  
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School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Major Bobby Ray Pinkston

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Approved by:

Ernest H. Evans Monograph Director  
Ernest H. Evans, Ph.D.

Danny M. Davis Director, School of  
COL Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS Advanced Military  
Studies

Philip J. Brookes Director, Graduate  
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Program

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## ABSTRACT

THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT OF POWER IN SMALL WARS: THE CASE OF EL SALVADOR  
by MAJ Bobby Ray Pinkston, 39 pages.

This monograph discusses the role the American military instrument of power played in supporting the government of El Salvador during its battle against rebel forces during the period 1980-1992. The U.S. provided extensive military, political and economic assistance to the Salvadoran government during this period. This study determines the specific contributions of the U.S. military assistance.

This study first examines the geographic, economic, and political background of El Salvador. It then examines the course of the Salvadoran revolution, with emphasis on the American military involvement. Next, it analyzes the specific contributions the U.S. military made in supporting the Salvadoran government.

Finally, this monograph highlights the unique contributions of the U.S. military instrument of power and also the military lessons learned from the involvement in El Salvador. This evaluation of the military instrument of power, and the lessons learned from its use in El Salvador, help provide insight into the potential uses of the military instrument of power in future "small wars."

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## Chapter I

### Introduction

The period 1980-1992<sup>1</sup> was one of turmoil and civil war in El Salvador. The government of El Salvador fought a prolonged war against left-wing revolutionary groups. The United States government assisted the Salvadoran government throughout the conflict. The United States provided political, economic, and military assistance to the Salvadorans. This study examines the role of American military support.

This monograph answers the following question: What role did the United States military play in preventing the overthrow of the government of El Salvador during the period 1980-1992? This monograph also answers the following three supporting questions:

1. What was the military, political, and economic background of the revolution in El Salvador?
2. What could realistically be expected of the U.S. military in El Salvador, given the conditions under which it had to operate?
3. What were the military lessons learned from the Salvadoran experience, and what are the applications for other small wars?

By answering the research question and the three supporting questions, this monograph will draw conclusions and make some basic recommendations. This study will not exhaust this subject, since the topics of the Salvadoran revolution and small wars are too extensive to be dealt with in a single study.

This monograph determines the exact role the U.S. military played in supporting the Salvadoran government. Military assistance was only one portion of the American assistance provided. Yet, this study will demonstrate

that this military assistance was critical to maintaining the Salvadoran government during the revolution. This study also describes the military lessons learned and the application of these lessons to future conflicts.

The methods used in this study are (1) to examine the nature and background of the Salvadoran revolution, with special emphasis on the period 1980-1992, (2) determine the type of military assistance provided by the U.S. and the impact this assistance had, (3) explain the conditions and limitations placed upon military assistance given to the Salvadorans, (4) determine the unique contributions (i.e., those aspects not achievable by other instruments of power) of the U.S. military to stabilizing the Salvadoran government, and (5) discuss the military lessons learned from El Salvador and their applicability to future conflicts. These methods enable this monograph to answer the primary and secondary research questions.

The title of this monograph uses the term "small wars." It is important to define and explain this term. This study borrows the term from John M. Collins who defines "small wars" as those wars that, "fall on the conflict spectrum between normal peacetime competition and any kind of armed combat that depletes U.S. forces slightly, if at all."<sup>2</sup> This definition is in agreement with both Joint Publication 3-0<sup>3</sup> and FM 100-5<sup>4</sup>, which define small wars as lying in that zone called "conflict," which lies between "war," and "peace time." Collins further states that it is the "limitation on violence, rather than the force levels and arsenals," that determine the nature of small wars.<sup>5</sup> Using Collins definition, it is entirely possible for a large force to be in a "small war."

Collins provides several examples of those military actions that are common in small wars. These include Phases I and II of an insurgency, counterinsurgency, coup d'etat, transnational terrorism, anti/counterterrorism, "narco" conflict, and minor conventional wars.<sup>6</sup> Joint Publication 3-0, published four years after Collins' book, uses an almost identical list to describe military activities that usually occur in small wars.<sup>7</sup>

For the U.S., according to Collins' definition, small wars are those wars in which American units do not take significant direct combat actions, and casualties represent an insignificant amount of the forces employed. By this and the criteria listed above, El Salvador is a small war from the American perspective, although it was not a small war for the Salvadorans. The number of American soldiers operating in El Salvador probably never exceeded 300 at any given time,<sup>8</sup> and the total number of Americans killed in twelve years of conflict was 17.<sup>9</sup> Still, the U.S. did provide over one billion dollars in military aid<sup>10</sup> during the period 1980-1990. This is significant since El Salvador's annual gross domestic product is only six billion dollars.<sup>11</sup> This total ranked fifth highest among all the U.S. military aid provided during the period 1980-1990.<sup>12</sup>

This study addresses El Salvador for two reasons. These reasons are (1) the military aid provided was significant, yet still within the framework of a small war, and (2) since the signing of the peace accord in 1992, the situation in El Salvador has been relatively stable.<sup>13</sup>

This monograph is written for those interested in the military instrument of power in small wars, and also those interested in the conflict in El



Salvador. It will be primarily concerned with the American military involvement in the revolution, though it will also analyze the conflict as a whole. The focus will be on determining the exact role that the American military instrument of power played in supporting the Salvadorans in their struggle against the left-wing revolutionaries. The study recognizes that the military instrument of power was just one instrument used by the U.S. to support the Salvadorans. One challenge this study undertakes is to determine those roles that were unique to the U.S. military and those instances where the military had a complementary role.

This study has two major limitations. These are (1) the research is limited to published sources, and (2) the study limits itself to English-language publications, or works translated into English. Neither limitation prevents the study from achieving its stated purpose.

The monograph limits its research to published sources for several reasons. The most important reason is that published accounts represent the author's most accessible and refined material. It is the material the author was willing to show the world, and have it recorded for history. Interviews can be very informative. Still, the ideas and opinions that have the most influence are those that are written and most often those ideas written for professional publications. This study uses several published extracts from interviews and speeches. All published sources used are books, government documents, professional journals, or major magazines.

The study used only English-language or translated documents. The author does not speak or read Spanish which is the other major language for documents about El Salvador. This is not a serious limitation since the primary focus

of this study is the American military instrument of power. Most of the information on this is published in English. The majority of the background information is taken from writers who are fluent in both English and Spanish. In addition, there are many other aspects of the Salvadoran revolution that are outside the scope of this study. The bibliography at the end of the monograph is a good starting point for those interested in other aspects of the revolution.

Despite the limitations of this study, the material presented is adequate to cover the topic. Anyone interested in studying the role of the U.S. military instrument of power in El Salvador will find this study a good introduction to the topic. The hope is that this monograph will stimulate an interest in the role of the military instrument of power not only in El Salvador, but also in other small wars.

## Chapter II

### Background-El Salvador

This section is an outline of the geography, economy, and political history of El Salvador. These factors are keys to understanding the events that led to the Salvadoran revolution and the environment in which it took place. Its physical, economic, and political characteristics have and continue to contribute to the problems of El Salvador. It is difficult to understand the situation in El Salvador without some appreciation of these factors.

### Geography

The Republic of El Salvador is a small country on the west coast of Central America. It covers an area of 21,041 square kilometers or 8,120 square miles.<sup>14</sup> This is approximately the size of the state of Massachusetts. It has an estimated population of 5.4 million, of which 94% are Mestizo and 6% Caucasian.<sup>15</sup> El Salvador has a population density of 239 persons per square kilometer<sup>16</sup> or 665 persons per square mile. This is the highest population density in North or South America.<sup>17</sup> By way of comparison the population density of some other nations in the western hemisphere are the following:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Population per Square Kilometer</u>
United States	26
Mexico	41
Guatemala	80
Honduras	44
Nicaragua	28
Costa Rica	57
Panama	31 <sup>18</sup>

The high population density and lack of available land have contributed and continue to contribute to the political and economic turmoil of the country.<sup>19</sup> These factors will again be discussed in subsequent sections.

The landscape is dominated by two parallel mountain ranges that run east to west. These divide the country into three regions: mountains, central plateau, and coastal plains.<sup>20</sup> Most of the population lives in the central plateau and the coastal plains. These are also the only two regions suitable for widespread farming. The climate throughout the region is tropical, with a pronounced wet season from May to October, and a dry season from November to April. Temperatures throughout the region show little seasonal change.<sup>21</sup>

El Salvador has approximately 10,000 kilometers of roads, of which approximately 1,500 are paved.<sup>22</sup> The country has 600 kilometers of railroad.<sup>23</sup> There are two major ports, Acajutla and La Union, but only one airport, Ilopang International, that is capable of accommodating jet aircraft.<sup>24</sup>

#### Economy

The economy of El Salvador is, and has been, dominated by three factors. These factors are (1) a high population density, (2) a scarcity of land that is suitable for agriculture, and (3) the growing and milling of coffee as the nation's largest means of export revenue.<sup>25</sup>

El Salvador is a poor country with an annual gross domestic product of six billion dollars per year.<sup>26</sup> This is a per capita GDP of approximately \$1,111 per person per year. This compares with a GDP of

over five trillion dollars (\$17,500 per person) for the United States, and 200 billion dollars (2,484 per person) for Mexico.<sup>27</sup> However, the low El Salvadoran GDP and per capita GDP do not compare unfavorably with the other nations of Central America, as illustrated in the chart below:

<u>Country</u>	<u>GDP (BN)</u>	<u>Per Capita (\$)</u>
Guatemala	8.5	850
Costa Rica	5.0	1,700
Honduras	4.6	900
Panama	4.2	1,850
Nicaragua	1.5	250 <sup>28</sup>

El Salvador is not unique among Central American countries that are poor. Other factors, however, make the situation in El Salvador more acute. One factor is population density. Another one is that while El Salvador has enjoyed an overall economic growth rate of 4.2% since 1950,<sup>29</sup> its growth rate was -8.1% in the period 1979-1982, and only 3.5% in the period 1974-1979.<sup>30</sup> Since 1982 the growth rate has been a modest 1.6%.<sup>31</sup> In 1982, the real per capita GDP was almost the same as it had been in 1950, making El Salvador the second poorest country in Central America.<sup>32</sup>

There are many reasons for El Salvador's poor economic performance. Geography and population density are two factors. Zanny Minton-Beddoes has listed in a recent article four other factors that affect El Salvador, as well as many other Latin American countries. These are

- Political instability
- Low savings and investment rates

-What little that is saved is consumed by inflation

-Banks are unsound, weak, and frequently used by government to finance favored projects<sup>33</sup>

All these factors apply to El Salvador, but are not enough to explain the country's poor economic performance. An examination of the structure of the Salvadoran economy and the role of export agriculture (i.e., coffee) is needed to complete the economic picture.

Agriculture represents 24% of El Salvador's GDP. The remaining portions are services 49%, industry/construction 21%, and other 6%.<sup>34</sup> By comparison, agriculture represents less than 10% of the U.S. GDP.<sup>35</sup> Agriculture represents approximately 90% of El Salvador's exports, as compared to less than 10% for the U.S.<sup>36</sup> Coffee exports represent 80-90% of the country's agriculture exports and 70-80% percent of the nation's total export value.<sup>37</sup> With 70-80% percent of the country's export value concentrated in one product, coffee, the fate of the national economy rests on coffee and those who produce it.<sup>38</sup>

Richard Fagen has demonstrated that a 25% drop in the worldwide price of coffee will cost the Salvadoran economy 330 million dollars (5.5% of the total economy).<sup>39</sup> Yet, because the whole of Central America produces only 13% of the world's coffee, the country lacks the leverage to influence world markets.<sup>40</sup> The economy is thus very vulnerable to market forces that are beyond the control of the government of El Salvador. Jeffery Paige writes of El Salvador, "If coffee is good, the economy is good; if it is bad, the economy is bad."<sup>41</sup>

Coffee was widely cultivated in El Salvador by the 1850s.<sup>42</sup> The lava ash soil and moderate elevations make the country well suited for coffee production. By 1931, for example, coffee represented 95.5% of the country's exports.<sup>43</sup>

Coffee requires extensive acreage to be grown profitably. Over time this has led to a situation where most agricultural land is concentrated in the hands of a small number of coffee growers. The vast majority of the rural population has no land, or only small plots. For example, in 1970-71 60% of the rural population had no land, and 64% of the land in El Salvador belonged to 4% of the nation's farmers.<sup>44</sup>

Enrique Baloyra-Herp states that in the late 1960s El Salvador had 226,000 farms.<sup>45</sup> 2260 of these farms were over 500 acres and accounted for 38% of the land. "By contrast," writes Baloyra-Herp, "the more than 207,000 smallest farms averaging 4.10 acres and representing 91 percent of all farms, accounted for 22 percent."<sup>46</sup>

Not only has coffee production resulted in great concentration of wealth and land in the hands of a small number of coffee growers, it has produced a large landless class, whose only occupation is seasonal, agricultural work.<sup>47</sup> This has produced the largest rural proletariat (a social class whose members possess nothing but their hands with which to work) in all of Central America.<sup>48</sup> Baloyra-Herp believes that changes in agriculture, fast demographic growth, unequal distribution of property, and a small territory produced a proletariat of peasants that were "available for political mobilization, and eventually there emerged

organizations willing and able to lead them into the politics of protest and insurrection."<sup>49</sup>

The challenge to El Salvador, as stated by David Browning, is that El Salvador does not have enough land to allow the peasants adequate land for subsistence agriculture, and yet devote enough land to the only cash crop, coffee, the country currently has.<sup>50</sup> Put differently, the nation could not continue politically with its current land distribution, yet the country could not survive economically the loss of the revenue generated by exporting coffee.

#### Politics

Since El Salvador gained independence from Spain in 1821 and Mexico in 1823<sup>51</sup> the nation's politics have been characterized by revolts, coups d'etat, and continual political instability. The term most commonly used to describe the government is oligarchy. The Salvadoran oligarchy, at least since 1932, has been a power sharing arrangement between the coffee growers and the armed forces.<sup>52</sup>

From 1871-1927 the government was controlled by the coffee elites who ran the country like a "private business."<sup>53</sup> The period 1927-1931 was a time of economic and political unrest, much of this due to a drop in coffee demand because of the Great Depression. The 1932 communist-led revolution or Matanza caused the collapse of the oligarchic regime and its replacement by a period of personalist dictatorship, 1932-1948.<sup>54</sup> The most famous of these dictators was General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez (1932-1944). This period was one of increased centralized control and government growth.<sup>55</sup>



The period 1948-1960 was one in which the traditional oligarchy began to face the pressures of economic and political liberalism. Baloyra-Herp calls this "reactionary despotism" and writes "state power became public at the time and the traditional oligarchies no longer ruled directly, although they were able to weave a relatively complex alliance."<sup>56</sup> He further adds,

In essence the traditional oligarchies called upon actors within the military to restore order through repression, and thereby traded their direct monopoly of the government for the preservation of the economic model.<sup>57</sup>

The period 1960-1972 was a continuation of "reactionary despotism" with the addition of a number of new actors to the political process. These actors included other Central American countries, other political parties (Christian Democrats, ORDEN-a paramilitary party, and several left-wing parties), and the United States.<sup>58</sup> Each of these had an influence on politics that had never been seen before. The increasing popularity of the Christian Democrats lead by Jose Napoleon Duarte prior to the election of 1972 is seen as a watershed in Salvadoran politics.

What emerges in the early 1970s is a political situation in which power is shared by the oligarchy of coffee growers and the armed forces,<sup>59</sup> but in which there are for the first time significant other players. The pressure from these other players and the continuing economic and political discontent among the rural masses put the Salvadoran government under serious stress. This was evident leading up to the 1972 elections, which this monograph regards as the watershed for the revolution of 1980-1992. The inability of the Salvadoran government

to meet the changing demands of its citizens, coupled with increased left-wing agitation and other outside influences set in motion the events that would lead to the revolution.

### Salvadoran Revolution

This section will provide an outline of the Salvadoran revolution. It is not possible to cover the revolution in great detail, since entire books have been written on this subject.<sup>60</sup> It is, however, necessary to have a general understanding of the conflict in order to understand the U.S.'s role in the conflict.

Most observers see the refusal by the oligarchy and the military to accept the election in 1972 of the Christian Democrats under Duarte as the beginning of a chain of events that set the revolution in motion.<sup>61</sup> Other factors aggravating the situation were the continuing rural and urban discontent, the expansion of left-wing political and military organizations,<sup>62</sup> and continued government repression and human rights violations. Because of these government activities, the Carter administration suspended all military aid to El Salvador in 1977.

In October 1979 a group of junior officers overthrew the government of General Carlos Humberto Romero and installed a provisional junta "that incorporated progressive civilians..., and pledged to make an opening to the left, investigate human rights abuses, and implement land reform."<sup>63</sup> Despite these intentions, the junta was unable to control forces from the right or the left. The period 1980-81 was one of the bloodiest in Salvadoran history with over 21,000 people being killed by right and left-wing forces.<sup>64</sup> This was a period of increased

violence by both sides. Each resorted to murder, kidnapping, and other acts of terrorism.

Left-wing rebels were aided in 1979 by the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government by the Sandinista National Liberation Front,<sup>65</sup> and by increased aid from the Soviet Union and Cuba. Exactly how much aid the Salvadoran rebels received from the Soviet Union and Cuba is unknown, but in the early 1980s the U.S. government believed it to be extensive.<sup>66</sup> The situation in the early 1980s did indeed look bleak for the Salvadoran government.

Fear of communist expansion into Central America prompted the U.S. to provide substantial economic and military aid to the Salvadoran government. Below is a listing of direct military aid provided to El Salvador from 1980-89:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Military Aid (millions)</u>
1980	5.0
1981	40.0
1982	75.0
1983	80.0
1984	210.0
1985	140.0
1986	130.0
1987	120.0
1988	90.0
1989	90.0 <sup>67</sup>

During this same period the U.S. provided over 2.5 billion dollars in economic aid,<sup>68</sup> as well as financing extensive training for the Salvadoran military. These factors, plus a more dedicated effort on the part of the Salvadorans, did serve to "narrow" the conflict after 1983.

In 1984 El Salvador held relatively free elections in which Jose Napoleon Duarte, a Christian Democrat, was elected president.<sup>69</sup>

Still, the government of El Salvador continued to have to fight insurgents, control right-wing security elements, and to implement government and land reform. The country remained in turmoil, and by 1988 over 60,000 people had been killed.<sup>70</sup> In 1989 the Christian Democrats lost the elections to the right-wing Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) headed by Alfredo Cristiani. This was the first peaceful transfer of political power in Salvadoran history from one elected civilian president to another.<sup>71</sup>

In November 1989 the left-wing guerrillas, united in the FMLN, (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) launched their largest offensive of the conflict.<sup>72</sup> Over 1,000<sup>73</sup> civilians were killed before the offensive was halted. Yet, the defeat of this offensive cleared the way for the right-wing government and left-wing insurgents to begin serious peace negotiations. In April 1990 a formal cease-fire was signed,<sup>74</sup> and in January 1992 a peace settlement was signed in Chapultepec, Mexico.<sup>75</sup> Since then the situation in El Salvador has remained relatively peaceful.

This is an admittedly brief outline of the Salvadoran revolution. It does, however, provide a point of reference for understanding the U.S. involvement and support to the Salvadoran government which will be discussed in the next section.

## Background-U.S. Involvement

This section will examine the American involvement in the Salvadoran revolution, with special emphasis on U.S. military assistance to the Salvadoran government. Once this is completed, this study will have the background information necessary to analyze the contributions of the U.S. military in supporting the government of El Salvador during the revolution.

Serious U.S. political and military interest in El Salvador did not begin until the late 1970s. Prior to this time most U.S. interest in Central America had been directed towards other countries in the region.<sup>76</sup> Frederick Weaver has demonstrated that in the period 1960-1979 the largest recipient of U.S. military aid in Central America (Panama excepted) was Guatemala, followed by Nicaragua and Honduras.<sup>77</sup> Until 1980 U.S. military aid to El Salvador was fourth overall in the region, only exceeding one million dollars in 1975.<sup>78</sup> This changed only in 1980 when El Salvador received five million dollars in military aid.<sup>79</sup> Edward Best argues that in the mid 1970s all of Central America was being "confidently neglected" by the U.S.<sup>80</sup> Several events in Central America and throughout the world changed the American focus.

The two events in Central America that sharpened U.S. interest were the overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua in 1979 and the increased guerrilla activity in El Salvador at the time of the military-led coup against the Romero regime.<sup>81</sup> With the Sandinistas being openly Marxist-Leninist and the suspected support of the Salvadoran rebels by the Soviets and the Cubans, the government in

Washington came to see the Salvadoran revolution as another example of Soviet-led communist expansionism.<sup>82</sup> The Carter Administration further faced the situation in El Salvador against the background of the Iran hostage situation and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.<sup>83</sup> Edward Best argues that the Carter Administration was very sensitive about "losing anything else,"<sup>84</sup> especially anything as close as Central America. The Carter Administration, with its emphasis on human rights, had suspended all aid to El Salvador in 1977. By 1979 the worsening situation in the country compelled the administration to change its policy. The Carter Administration never developed a complete policy for El Salvador, but it did begin to formulate a general policy that would be expanded by the Reagan Administration. Laurence Whitehead describes this by saying,

What is clear is that, in the wake of the Nicaraguan revolution, oligarchic control in El Salvador rapidly weakened, creating a vacuum that necessarily drew in both Managua and Washington. The unquestioned American objective was to ensure that, what-else might take place in El Salvador, there would be no second armed revolution.<sup>85</sup>

Commenting on U.S. policy towards Central America during this time period Howard Wiarda has written, "Rhetoric aside, the Cold War is the reason the United States pays attention to Latin America."<sup>86</sup> The fact that the Salvadoran revolution was viewed in the larger context of the Cold War must not be forgotten. This fact had a tremendous influence on the policies of the Reagan Administration.

Most of the Salvadoran revolution took place during the Reagan Administration (1980-1988). When President Reagan took office the situation in El Salvador had been deteriorating for more than a year.

The Reagan Administration enacted a policy not very different from that of the Carter Administration. Tommie Sue Montgomery has described President Reagan's overall policy by writing,

The Reagan Administration had three objectives with its policy toward Central America: to depose the revolutionary government of Nicaragua, to establish a permanent military base in Honduras, and to defeat the Salvadoran FMLN militarily.<sup>87</sup>

While the Reagan Administration hoped for a military defeat of the Salvadoran rebels, both the President and the Congress recognized that the problem in El Salvador was more than a military one. Both recognized that many of the causes of the insurgency were the direct result of undemocratic policies and actions of the Salvadoran government.<sup>88</sup> Both the President and the Congress understood that insurgencies and revolutions are wars for moral legitimacy, and a lack of such legitimacy leaves a government extremely vulnerable to internal and external challenges.<sup>89</sup>

The Reagan Administration found itself in this dilemma which Edward Best describes as,

The dilemma for the U.S. was how to balance the function of aid of giving military advantage and external reassurances with that of sufficient internal political leverage to assure the promised progress toward moderate democracy.<sup>90</sup>

Any military aid to El Salvador would also be conducted against the background of the Vietnam War experience. El Salvador was the first sizeable U.S. involvement in an insurgency since the Vietnam War.<sup>91</sup> This would affect all aspects of the support for El Salvador. One of the most important points decided early on in the policy formulation phase was that no U.S. combat units would be committed to El Salvador.

Montgomery has stated that the overriding idea behind military support to the Salvadoran government was the KISSSS principle, which meant,

Keep  
It  
Simple  
Sustainable  
Small  
Salvadoran<sup>92</sup>

Ernest Evans points out another fallout from the Vietnam War when he notes that U.S. military personnel in El Salvador were called "trainers" rather than "advisors."<sup>93</sup> Strict limitations on the number of military personnel in El Salvador was another fallout from the Vietnam experience, although the 55-man limit was never congressionally mandated.<sup>94</sup>

The U.S. initiated a two-fold policy of support to the government of El Salvador. These were (1) fortify the Salvadoran armed forces to wear down the rebels and (2) bolster democracy so as to weaken the rebels's claim to legitimacy.<sup>95</sup> The first goal was to be accomplished primarily with military aid, while the second with economic aid and political pressure.

The U.S. provided over six billion dollars in total aid to the Salvadoran government during the period 1980-1989.<sup>96</sup> The military aid paid for new equipment and training for the Salvadoran forces, as well as humanitarian assistance conducted in conjunction with military operations.<sup>97</sup> Direct U.S. involvement in El Salvador was limited to 55 advisors actually working with Salvadoran forces. The U.S. military provided general military and counter-insurgency training to thousands



of Salvadoran officers and soldiers in both the U.S. and Panama.<sup>96</sup> The U.S. military also provided extensive intelligence collection and analysis support to the Salvadorans. The main focus of most of this training, according to Victor Rosello, an officer who worked with the Salvadoran forces in El Salvador, Panama, and the U.S., was (1) to train the Salvadoran Army to use new equipment and to perform basic combat operations, and (2) teach the Army the importance of human rights.<sup>99</sup>

The military aid and training the United States provided enabled the Salvadoran Army to grow from a force of around 12,000 in 1980 to a force of 45,000-60,000 by 1986.<sup>100</sup> Special forces personnel provided much of the training, although personnel from all branches assisted in providing this training.<sup>101</sup> By 1986 it was generally acknowledged that the Salvadoran military was performing much better, although there were continuing criticism of the Salvadoran Army's performance.<sup>102</sup> Despite shortcomings in the Salvadoran Army's performance, what is certain is that the rebels were never able to defeat the Army. This fact is widely recognized as setting the conditions which eventually led to the peace settlement in 1992.<sup>103</sup>

The U.S. military support had many limitations and constraints placed on it, both by the American government and by the Salvadoran government. The principle limitations imposed by the U.S. government were that no combat forces would be committed, that the actual number of military personnel in El Salvador would be limited, that there would be restrictions on the functions trainers could perform, and that the funding would be limited.<sup>104</sup> The constraints imposed by the Salvadorans

were more complex, with the most serious being the ability and willingness of the armed forces to follow American training and instructions.<sup>105</sup>

The American ban on combat units in El Salvador was inflexible. The limitation on the number of personnel in El Salvador was more selectively enforced, and available evidence suggests that the actual number of military personnel in country frequently exceeded 150.<sup>106</sup> Likewise, the restrictions on which functions trainers could perform (this restriction concerned their ability to accompany units on operations) also appears to be a matter that was selectively enforced.<sup>107</sup>

The Bacevich report criticizes U.S. military funding to the Salvadorans. The main objections were the unpredictability of the funding and the fact that there were few U.S. controls over how the Salvadorans spent the money.<sup>108</sup> A GAO report published in 1990 generally agrees with Bacevich's findings.<sup>109</sup> This was a problem throughout the entire period of the insurgency. A study of the military funding provided between 1980-89 reveals that the amounts actually appropriated were more the result of the political process in Washington than of any particular requirement in El Salvador.

The main limitations imposed by the Salvadorans were the inability or unwillingness of their armed forces to accept and put into practice the training provided by the U.S. military. The shortcomings of the Salvadorans are well documented.<sup>110</sup> Benjamin Schwarz lists some of these as (1) disengaged officers corps, (2) garrison mentality, (3) a conscript force, (4) excessive reliance of firepower, (5) troops will

not seize and hold ground, (6) the enemy is more highly motivated than the armed forces, and (7) officer promotions are based on year groups (tanda system) and not on individual ability.<sup>111</sup>

Describing the Salvadoran Army further, Stephen Hosmer writes,

The Salvadoran Army, for example, has manifested a reluctance to mount systematic and pervasive small-unit patrols, ambushes, and night operations that would progressively exhaust insurgent forces; they also failed to move permanently into areas where the guerrillas live and fight them there.<sup>112</sup>

In addition to its tactical and training shortfalls, the Salvadoran Army was well aware of its privileged position in Salvadoran society. It was, therefore, often unwilling to undertake reform or changes that would make military sense but not necessarily political sense to the armed forces.<sup>113</sup> Some examples of this include the creation of a professional NCO corps and sending soldiers to central training facilities.<sup>114</sup> Under the system used by the Salvadoran military, both of these changes would result in a loss of money to individual battalions.<sup>115</sup>

Despite these shortfalls, the Salvadoran armed forces did become better trained and more effective as the conflict continued. It would also be a mistake to believe the Salvadorans made no effort to improve.<sup>116</sup> In the analysis chapter, this study will argue that it was the increased effectiveness of the armed forces that did the most militarily to defeat the rebel insurgency. It must also be remembered that political and economic reforms in El Salvador contributed to the defeat of the rebels by robbing them of political legitimacy.

The purpose of this chapter has been to provide the background to the Salvadoran revolution and to U.S. military involvement in that revolution. It is necessary to understand these in order to have a basis to understand the role that the American military instrument of power had in the conflict. All conflicts have their unique aspects, and El Salvador is no exception. A failure to understand these characteristics can lead to a serious misunderstanding of the conflict.

With this background information it is now possible to analyze the specific contributions of the U.S. military and to determine their effectiveness and lasting value for future conflicts. The next chapter will concentrate on this.

### Chapter III

#### Analysis

The purpose of this chapter is to determine and analyze the role that the American military instrument of power played in supporting the Salvadoran government during the insurgency. The revolution in El Salvador was not primarily a military conflict; yet, as this study will demonstrate, it is a mistake to underestimate the role played by the military instrument of power.

The Salvadoran Army had two serious flaws in the early 1980s. These were (1) it lacked the strength, skill, training, and inclination needed to defeat the insurgents, and (2) it had lost the moral respect of the population because of its human rights violations and suspected links with right-wing death squads.<sup>117</sup> It was this army that had to be trained and reformed if there was any hope of the Salvadoran military defeating the rebels.

The U.S. military provided three categories of aid to the Salvadoran Army. These were equipment, training, and human rights instruction.<sup>118</sup> This aid was provided directly in El Salvador, and also by bringing Salvadoran officers and soldiers to the U.S. and Panama for training.

The equipment provided to the Salvadoran Army included weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, ammunition, uniforms, etc..<sup>119</sup> The U.S. provided direct aid and also assisted the Salvadorans in constructing facilities to produce food, uniforms and boots, manufacture

and store ammunition, and repair equipment.<sup>120</sup> The equipment and facilities not only provided the Army with more modern equipment and weapons, but it also enabled the Salvadorans to expand the size of their army.

In 1979 the Salvadoran Army had approximately 11,000 soldiers.<sup>121</sup> By 1988 it had over 45,000 soldiers.<sup>122</sup> This expansion was important since the Army was battling a guerrilla force with an estimated strength of 4,000-5,000 soldiers. In an insurgency a ratio of 10:1 is commonly accepted as the one needed to defeat the insurgents.<sup>123</sup> While this ratio is not a fixed rule, it is a sound planning factor.

Many factors assisted the Salvadorans in expanding their armed forces. The increased ability to equip, feed, and support these soldiers cannot be overlooked. Without U.S. military assistance, it is doubtful the Salvadorans would have been able to expand their armed forces as rapidly as they did.

Training assistance was a second type of support the U.S. provided the Salvadoran military. This training included all aspects of training from individual skills to battalion level tactics. Training was focused on the use of military equipment and the conduct of combat operations.<sup>124</sup> It focused on both the training of individual soldiers and unit level training. The U.S. also provided a significant amount of intelligence training to include collection and analysis techniques. Most of the unit level training was conducted in El Salvador, while individual training was conducted in El Salvador, Panama, and the United States.<sup>125</sup>

Special Forces soldiers provided much of the training to the Salvadorans, however, many soldiers from the conventional U.S. military also trained Salvadoran soldiers. The U.S. military focused its training on conventional operations,<sup>126</sup> although there was some specific counterinsurgency training.

Many sources<sup>127</sup> have criticized this emphasis on conventional operations instead of counterinsurgency operations. This criticism makes two points: (1) conventional military operations were inappropriate for the insurgency in El Salvador, and (2) the U.S. military's understanding of and ability to train counterinsurgent warfare are flawed.<sup>128</sup> The second issue goes beyond the scope of this study. What this study can discuss is why the Salvadorans were primarily trained in conventional operations and what the impact of this training was.

The key reason for the emphasis on training in conventional operations is the initial level of training of the Salvadoran armed forces. Most sources agree that in 1979 the Salvadoran military was poorly trained and not capable of conducting company level operations.<sup>129</sup> An army not capable of conducting basic unit level operations is not normally prepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations.<sup>130</sup> Under these circumstances the Salvadoran military had to first learn how to conduct basic military operations. This was the emphasis of the U.S. military training.

With some exceptions, the Salvadoran military never advanced beyond basic unit level training up to the battalion level. The primary reason

for this was the political nature of the military. The Salvadoran Army was composed of short-term conscripts with no professional NCO corps.<sup>131</sup> Even within the officer corps the emphasis was not always on professional competence.<sup>132</sup> These factors limited the ability of the Army to advance to more complicated counterinsurgency training.

Training on conventional operations may not be the best preparation for counterinsurgency operations, but its value in increasing the basic combat capability of the Salvadoran military cannot be underestimated. In 1979 the military had 11,000 soldiers and was not capable of basic unit level operations. By 1986 it had over 45,000 soldiers, and it had reached a level of training such that it was considered unlikely that the rebels could win a military victory.<sup>133</sup> Still, after six years of training and military aid, the military, while able to hold its own with the enemy, was not considered capable of decisively defeating the insurgency.<sup>134</sup> Three years later the situation was unchanged.<sup>135</sup>

The final area of U.S. military aid was in improving the human rights records of the armed forces. This was primarily done through individual and unit level training, with the emphasis on human rights and humane treatment of prisoners as a potential combat multiplier. Victor Rosello believes that it was this improvement in human rights that did more to legitimize the military and political gains of the Salvadoran government than any other single factor.<sup>136</sup> Rosello writes,

Military assistance must be packaged in a way that not only guarantees an improved combat capability for the host country, but also institutionalizes the values that personify the U.S. armed forces as guardians of democratic principles.<sup>137</sup>



Rosello admits that while it appears that day-to-day contact between the Americans and Salvadorans seemed to have been the best mechanism for transferring human rights values, he also points out that it is difficult to prove how such a "transfer of values" takes place.<sup>138</sup> Yet, interviews with Salvadoran military officers and rebel leaders seem to support Rosello's basic claim about the role of improved human rights in enhancing the combat capability and moral legitimacy of the military.<sup>139</sup>

Since the Salvadoran military could not decisively defeat the insurgents, what had been accomplished? The answer is that the training and moral legitimacy of the military had been raised to levels such that the guerrillas could not win a military victory. This gave the government of El Salvador the time it needed to implement basic political reforms and to begin negotiating a political settlement with the rebels.<sup>140</sup>

The main contributions of the U.S. military instrument of power were (1) it raised the basic combat efficiency of the Salvadoran military to a level that ensured it at least parity with the guerrillas and (2) it re-established a degree of moral legitimacy that had been absent from the military. The primary means for restoring this moral legitimacy were to improve basic military competency and a visible awareness that a good human rights record is a combat multiplier, especially in an insurgency.

The most important contribution made by the Salvadoran military to ending the insurgency was to buy the government critically needed time

to implement political reform. Militarily defeating the rebels would not have ended the conflict,<sup>141</sup> but by demonstrating that the rebels could not gain a military victory, the Salvadoran armed forces gave both sides an incentive to seek a political solution to the conflict.

When it became obvious to both sides in the late 1980s that the matter could not be solved militarily, then the basis was laid for a political settlement.<sup>142</sup> This would not have happened without the improved performance of the Salvadoran military. As long as the military option remained open to rebels, there was little incentive to seek a political solution. The same was true for the Salvadoran government.

Ernest Evans believes that the military stalemate set the conditions for the most important element of political change in El Salvador, the holding of free elections.<sup>143</sup> He believes that it was not just the holding of the elections, but the willingness of all parties to accept the election results that provided the real basis for political reform.<sup>144</sup> Evans makes his point with a quote from Che Guevara in which the revolutionary leader said,

When a government has come into power through some sort of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted.<sup>145</sup>

The combination of free elections and the improved efficiency of the Salvadoran military robbed the insurgency of its military potential and set the conditions for political reform and a political settlement

between the government and the rebels. The election of 1989 was the final manifestation of this.

In 1989 Alfredo Cristiani, a candidate from the right-wing ARENA (Nationalist Republican Alliance) party was elected president. To the surprise of many,<sup>146</sup> he began a political dialogue with the rebels that ended in a peace treaty in January 1992. The reasons for Cristiani's actions are complex, however, three of the most important were (1) neither side was capable of winning a military victory, (2) with the fall of the Soviet Union and world communism, neither side was as politically important as it once had been,<sup>147</sup> and (3) being a politician from the right-wing, he had the credentials needed to bring the right as well as the left to the negotiation table.<sup>148</sup> Explaining this last point Frederick Weaver writes,

Cristiani's role in this context reminds one of Richard Nixon, a man of the political right who took the United States (and the world) off the international gold standard, established diplomatic relations with the Peoples' Republic of China, and tacitly admitted defeat in Vietnam by withdrawing U.S. troops. The anomaly in the cases of both Cristiani and Nixon is that a president of even the political center would have had more difficulty in finding that much political latitude.<sup>149</sup>

The key point for this study is that the military stalemate laid the basis for Cristiani's actions. The primary reason for the stalemate was the improved combat efficiency of the Salvadoran military. This improved efficiency was primarily due to the combat and human rights training provided by the U.S. military. Without U.S. assistance it is difficult to see how the Salvadoran military could have reached this

level. This is the contribution of the U.S. military instrument of power.

This chapter has analyzed the role of the U.S. military instrument in supporting the Salvadorans during the revolution. It has determined that by equipping and training the Salvadoran armed forces, the U.S. military helped to raise the Salvadorans to a level at which a rebel military victory was unlikely. This set the conditions for a final political settlement between the government and the rebels.

In the next chapter this study will draw some conclusions from the conflict in El Salvador and examine some lessons learned. This will help to put this conflict in context and highlight its lasting value.

## Chapter IV

### Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter is to draw some conclusions concerning the role of the American military instrument of power during the Salvadoran insurgency. It will discuss some lessons learned about the military instrument of power and its applicability to future conflicts.

The criteria for determining what the military instrument of power contributed are (1) what the military instrument of power actually contributed, and (2) what actions could not have been accomplished by another instrument of power. The first criterion is empirical, the second is analytical. Based on these, the contributions of the American military instrument of power are the following:

1. It raised the basic level of military competence. The training and equipment provided by the U.S. military raised the level of combat competence to a point where the Salvadoran armed forces could perform successful combat operations. These improvements enabled the Salvadoran military to achieve military parity with the rebels, at times even defeating the insurgents. The armed forces' improved performance forced the military situation to a stalemate and denied rebels the possibility of a military victory. This stalemate set the conditions for the final political settlement between the government and the rebels.

2. The U.S. military provided human rights training and conditioning that raised the moral legitimacy of the Salvadoran armed forces. By the end of the conflict the Salvadoran military was an

increasingly professional force, no longer viewed as an undisciplined instrument of the political right. The improved training level and human rights records of the armed forces earned it the respect of the rebels and the Salvadoran people. This increased moral respect, so critical in an insurgency, ultimately robbed the rebels of a chance for military victory. The only option left open to the insurgents was a political settlement.<sup>150</sup>

3. The improved efficiency of the Salvadoran military convinced the rebels that they could not come to power by purely military means. At a minimum, the Salvadoran military gained time for the government to enact a package of political reforms. The government could be certain that the rebels would be more receptive to a political settlement, since it was unlikely that it could win a military victory. Without the increased combat competency and moral standing of the military, it is unlikely that the rebels would have discontinued their military struggle.<sup>151</sup>

4. The military stalemate, primarily due to the improved capability of the Salvadoran military, set the conditions for the political settlement. As long as a military option was available, there was less incentive on the part of either party to seek a political solution. With the military option no longer a viable one, both sides reconciled themselves to accepting a negotiated political settlement. The improved effectiveness of the Salvadoran armed forces took away the guerrillas' military option and set the foundation for the final political agreement.

The important point about all these contributions is that none of them could have been accomplished without the American military instrument of power. No other instrument could have raised the level of training and the human rights performance of the Salvadoran military. This is the contribution of the U.S. military instrument of power to supporting the Salvadoran government during the revolution. By denying the rebels the possibility of a military victory, the military set the conditions for a negotiated settlement. The cornerstone in the settlement of the Salvadoran revolution was the impossibility of a military victory by the rebels.

The final section will discuss some important lessons learned from the use of the American military instrument of power in El Salvador. The Department of Defense and the United States Army have no exact criteria for what constitutes a lesson learned. This study therefore uses three criteria that are widely employed by historians and political scientists.<sup>152</sup> These are (1) the lessons have to be widespread and involve enough people so that they are not considered isolated occurrences, (2) the lessons must be considered in the context of time, space, and historical circumstances (i.e. they must avoid what historians call the "didactic fallacy"),<sup>153</sup> and (3) the lessons must be repeatable under a wide range of circumstances. Using these criteria this study has determined five major lessons which it believes have applicability beyond the conflict in El Salvador. It is important to remember that all lessons learned are contextual. Still, for the above

listed reasons the following lessons are believed to have future application. These lessons are the following:

1. Defeating an insurgency is a long and expensive military undertaking. El Salvador was a relatively small insurgency involving 4,000-5,000 guerrillas and 40,000-50,000 soldiers.<sup>154</sup> Despite this, the insurgency lasted 12 years and cost the U.S. one billion dollars in direct military aid, 2.5 billion dollars in direct economic aid, and over two billion dollars in other aid.<sup>155</sup> In addition, the rebellion cost approximately 75,000 Salvadoran lives and 17 American lives.<sup>156</sup>

The lesson is that insurgencies are demanding military affairs. Defeating insurgents, even in a small rebellion, is an expensive and time consuming endeavor. This is the first lesson from the Salvadoran conflict.

2. In combating an insurgency it is wise to keep the number of foreign troops to a minimum.<sup>157</sup> This has several benefits. It puts the host nation on notice that it is its insurgency to fight, and that it cannot count on foreign troops to fight its battles.<sup>158</sup> Another advantage is that the use of national troops helps the host nation maintain respect and moral legitimacy. This puts the host nation in a stronger position to transition from a military to a political solution.

Keeping foreign troops to a minimum also prevents the rebels from capitalizing on the nationalism issue. When host nation troops carry the burden of the fighting, this potentially volatile issue is denied to the insurgents.<sup>159</sup> Also, when few outside troops are involved, foreign



nations can maintain disinterested leverage in the situation that is not possible if they are a committed participant. The political and military leverage the United States exercised during the Salvadoran revolution would not have been possible had the United States been decisively engaged with military forces.<sup>160</sup>

3. "Winning" or "losing" in the military context have little meaning in an insurgency. Insurgencies are wars for moral legitimacy, not wars in the classic context. A "military victory" will not necessarily promise the defeat of the insurgency. As Jose Garcia notes, "Honest elections, government reform, civic action in conflict zones and so on are not mere supporting factors in an essentially military conflict. It is the other way around."<sup>161</sup> Insurgencies are predominantly political conflicts. The military instrument of power has a definite, but limited role. An attempt to win an insurgency by purely military means will almost certainly fail.

4. The military instrument of power is best used in a supporting role. This follows the point made in lesson number three. Insurgencies and revolutions are primarily political conflicts. They are defeated primarily by political settlements, not military ones.

This does not mean that the military instrument of power has no role in defeating insurgencies. The case of El Salvador clearly demonstrates that it does. The military can buy the government time, and by militarily defeating the rebels, help set the conditions for a peaceful settlement. The final defeat of an insurgency, however, must

be political. This characteristic separates insurgencies from general wars.

5. The military instrument of power must be closely linked to political reforms. Ernest Evans notes, "The lesson of the war in El Salvador is that U.S. support for the democratization of El Salvador proved to be a plus in combating the FMLN."<sup>162</sup> The U.S. strategy for supporting El Salvador had two main avenues: military and political. While not synonymous, they had to be synchronized in order to be effective. The military can defeat rebels on the battlefield, but only the political process can undercut the moral legitimacy of the insurgents. So long as the guerrillas can maintain moral and political legitimacy, they are still a viable force.

The U.S. stressed two elements of political reform. These were (1) fair and open elections and (2) a willingness on the part of all parties to accept the results of the elections.<sup>163</sup> By accepting the results of the political process, the U.S. demonstrated the sovereignty of the Salvadoran people. This fact coupled with the military battle against the rebels being a Salvadoran fight, demonstrated to all parties that the Salvadoran revolution was being settled by Salvadorans. This added tremendous moral legitimacy to the final political settlement. It allowed the final peace settlement to be seen as a Salvadoran solution and not one imposed by outside forces.

This study has evaluated the contributions of the military instrument of power, and also some lessons learned from the use of the military instrument of power. It used El Salvador as a case study

because the revolution there was recent enough to be relevant, but for now is a closed case. El Salvador was a success story for the military in the sense that the rebels did not win. In the larger context it demonstrated that political reforms are the best tool for defeating counterinsurgencies.

There is much to be learned by a study of El Salvador. This is not to imply that El Salvador is a blueprint for handling all future insurgencies. All insurgencies are unique. Still, the cautious use of the military instrument of power, closely linked to ongoing political reforms, is an effective means of defeating guerrilla insurgencies.

El Salvador was America's first major counterinsurgency operation following the Vietnam War. The approach used in El Salvador was entirely different from the one used in Vietnam, yet it was more successful. As Benjamin Schwarz notes, ten years of American military, economic, and political assistance to El Salvador did bring six free elections, the first peaceful transfers of political power in the nation's history, an overall decline in political violence by all parties, and a negotiated political settlement.<sup>164</sup> Schwarz further adds that the real contribution of American assistance is, "that it is impossible to imagine any point in the past decade or in the future when El Salvador would not be a far more violent and unjust place, but for the American effort."<sup>165</sup>

The lesson from El Salvador is that the military instrument of power is just an instrument. It is not an end in itself. It is one tool to accomplishing a political objective. Years ago Clausewitz

reminded the world that "war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."<sup>166</sup> He further noted that "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."<sup>167</sup> For the U.S. the revolution in El Salvador has shown the wisdom of this comment.

<sup>1</sup>These are the generally accepted dates for the Salvadoran revolution. See Ernest Evans, "The Lessons of the War in El Salvador," Maestro Vol. 3 No. 3 (June 1995): 25. Also see Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 1.

<sup>2</sup>John M. Collins, America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's (US) Inc, 1991), 4.

<sup>3</sup>Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1 February 1995), I-2.

<sup>4</sup>FM 100-5, Operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993), 2-0 - 2-1.

<sup>5</sup>Collins, 4.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid, 4-5.

<sup>7</sup>Joint Publication 3-0, I-2.

<sup>8</sup>See A.J. Bacevich and other, American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador (Cambridge, MA: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), 5. Also see Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1983), 314.

<sup>9</sup>Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustration of Reform and the Illusion of Nation Building (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1992), 3.

<sup>10</sup>El Salvador: Accountability for U.S. Military and Economic Aid (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, September 1990), 11.

<sup>11</sup>The Economist Atlas (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1991), 132.

<sup>12</sup>Schwarz, 2.

<sup>13</sup>See Thomas K. Adams, "Disengage, Disarm, Demobilize: The Success of ONUSAL in Implementing the 1992 El Salvador Peace Accord," Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement Vol.3 No.2 (Autumn 1994) 290-300. Also see Steven Metz, Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1995), 18.

<sup>14</sup>Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-150, El Salvador: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1990), xiii. Also see Economist Atlas, 135.

<sup>15</sup>El Salvador: A Country Study, xiv.

<sup>16</sup>Economist Atlas, 135.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 122-135.

<sup>19</sup>See Enrique Baloyra-Herp, "Reactionary Despotism in Central America," Journal of Latin American Studies Vol. 15 Part 2 (November 1983): 296. Also see David Browning, "Agrarian Reform in El Salvador," Journal of Latin American Studies Vol. 15 Part 2 (November 1983): 406.

<sup>20</sup>El Salvador: A Country Study, xv.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid. For a more complete survey of Salvadoran geography see David Browning, El Salvador: Landscape and Society (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

<sup>22</sup>El Salvador: A Country Study, xv.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., xvi.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>See Jeffery M. Paige, "Coffee and Power in El Salvador," Latin American Research Review Vol. XXI No. 3 (1986): 7-40 and Samuel Stone, "Production and Politics in Central America's Convulsions," Journal of Latin American Studies Vol. 15 Part 2 (November 1983): 456-459. Also see Enrique Baloyra-Herp, El Salvador in Transition (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina, 1982), 5-14 and Frederick Stirton Weaver, Inside the Volcano: The History and Political Economy of Central America (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 87-89 and 131-135.

<sup>26</sup>Economist Atlas, 132.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 82.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 132.

<sup>29</sup>Montgomery, 24.

<sup>30</sup>Victor Bulmer-Thomas, "Economic Development Over the Long Run - Central America Since 1920," Journal of Latin American Studies Volume 15 Part 2 (November 1983): 272.

<sup>31</sup>Montgomery, 24.

<sup>32</sup>Bulmer-Thomas, 276. Also see Hector Perez Brignoli, "Growth and Crisis in the Central American Economies, 1950-1980," Journal of Latin American Studies Vol. 15 Part 2 (November 1983): 366-368 and 393-398.

<sup>33</sup>Zanny Minton-Beddoes, "Latin American Finance," The Economist, 9 December 1995.

<sup>34</sup>El Salvador: A Country Study, 106.

<sup>35</sup>Economist Atlas, 126.

<sup>36</sup>Weaver, 158.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid. Also see William C. Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises: Agrarian Reform and the Latin American Campesino (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 140.

<sup>38</sup>For the influence of coffee on the Salvadoran economy see the previously cited works by Baloyra-Herp, Weaver, Browning, Paige, Brognoli, and Stone. Also see Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, El Salvador: The Face of Revolution (Boston: South End Press, 1982), especially Chapter 1 entitled "Where Coffee Is King."

<sup>39</sup>Richard Fagen, Forging Peace: The Challenge of Central America (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 18.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>Paige, 14.

<sup>42</sup>Montgomery, 29.

<sup>43</sup>Thiesenhusen, 140.

<sup>44</sup>Fagen, 76.

<sup>45</sup>Enrique Baloyra-Herp, "El Salvador" in Latin American Politics and Development, ed. Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 486.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>Billie R. DeWalt, "The Agrarian Bases of Conflict in Central America," in The Central American Crisis: Sources of Conflict and the Failure of U.S. Policy, ed. Kenneth M. Coleman and George C. Herring (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc.), 50-52.

<sup>48</sup>Stone, 457.

<sup>49</sup>Baloyra-Herp, "El Salvador," 488.

<sup>50</sup>Browning, "Agrarian Reform," 400.

<sup>51</sup>Baloyra-Herp, "El Salvador," 488.

<sup>52</sup>Baloyra-Herp, "Reactionary Despotism," 295.

<sup>53</sup>Baloyra-Herp, "El Salvador," 488.

<sup>54</sup>For a full account of the Matanza see Thomas P. Anderson, Matanza: El Salvador's Communist Revolt of 1932 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971).

<sup>55</sup>Baloyra-Herp, "El Salvador," 489.

<sup>56</sup>Baloyra-Herp, "Reactionary Despotism," 295.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., 306-307.

<sup>58</sup>Montgomery, 51.

<sup>59</sup>For details of how the Salvadoran military views its role in government see Charles W. Anderson, "El Salvador: The Army as Reformer," in Political Systems of Latin America ed. Martin C. Needler (Princeton: Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 1964); Christopher Dickey, "Obedezco Pero No Cumplo [I obey but I do not comply]," in Central America: Anatomy of Conflict ed. Robert S. Leiken (New York: Perfamom Press, 1984), 36-43; and Richard Millett, "Praetorians or Patriots? The Central American Military" also in the Leiken book.

<sup>60</sup>See previously cited works by Baloyra-Herp, Montgomery, and Armstrong and Shenk. Also see Salvador Giralt Barra, "El Salvador: History of an Insurgency," Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement Vol. 3 No. 2 (Autumn 1994): 259-289 and Edward Best, U.S. Policy and Regional Security in Central America (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 13-20, 22-28, and 100-109.

<sup>61</sup>Fagen, 77. Also see El Salvador: A Country Study, xxiii.

<sup>62</sup>For a detailed listing of such organizations see Barraza, 271.

<sup>63</sup>Fagen, 78.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid.

<sup>65</sup>See John A. Booth, "Nicaragua: Revolution Under Siege," in Latin American Politics and Development ed. Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 471-472.

<sup>66</sup>See The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central American and the Caribbean (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and Department of Defense, 1985) and The Challenge to Democracy in Central America (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and Department of Defense, 1986).

<sup>67</sup>El Salvador: Accountability for U.S. Military and Economic Aid, 11.



<sup>68</sup>Ibid., 24.

<sup>69</sup>Montgomery, 182-183.

<sup>70</sup>El Salvador: A Country Study, xxii.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid.

<sup>72</sup>See The FMLN Offensive: Republic of El Salvador-the Singlsub Commission Report (Alexandria: Free World Foundation, 1990), 13-15.

<sup>73</sup>El Salvador: A Country Study, xxvii.

<sup>74</sup>Barraza, 287.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., 288. Barraza also lists all the meetings and conferences leading up to the signing of the peace accords.

<sup>76</sup>Weaver, 181.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid.

<sup>79</sup>El Salvador: Accountability for U.S. Military and Economic Aid, 11.

<sup>80</sup>Best, 10-11.

<sup>81</sup>Laurence Whitehead, "Explaining Washington's Central America Politics," Journal of Latin American Studies Vol. 15 Part 2 (November 1983): 329.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., 321.

<sup>83</sup>Best, 23.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

<sup>85</sup>Whitehead, 329.

<sup>86</sup>Howard J. Wiarda, "United States Policy in Latin America," Current History Vol. 89 No.543 (January 1990): 31. Also see Cynthia J. Arnson and Johanna Medelson Forman, "United States Policy in Central America," Current History Vol. 90 No. 554 (March 1991): 97-100.

<sup>87</sup>Montgomery, 5.

<sup>88</sup>Jose Z. Garcia, "Tragedy in El Salvador," Current History Vol. 89 No. 543 (January 1990): 40. Also see Schwarz, 8.

<sup>89</sup>John Fishel and Edmund S. Cowan, "Civil-Military Operations and the War for Moral Legitimacy in Latin America, "Military Review Vol. LXVIII No. 1 (January 1988): 37.

<sup>90</sup>Best, 38.

<sup>91</sup>For an overview of the problem of Vietnam and its effects on policy in El Salvador see George C. Herring, "Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Uses of History," in The Central American Crisis: Sources of Conflict and The Failures of U.S. Policy, ed. Kenneth M. Coleman and George C. Herring (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1985), 97-100.

<sup>92</sup>Montgomery, 148.

<sup>93</sup>Evans, "Lessons," 25.

<sup>94</sup>"Interview: Special Forces in El Salvador," Special Warfare Vol. 6 No. 4 (October 1993): 36.

<sup>95</sup>Schwarz, v.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>97</sup>Fishel, "Civil-Military Operations," 48.

<sup>98</sup>Whitehead, 347.

<sup>99</sup>Victor M. Rosello, "Lessons From El Salvador, "Parameters Vol 23 No. 4 (Winter 1993-94): 104.

<sup>100</sup>See "Interview," 37 and Adams, 296. One of the difficulties in determining army personnel strength is that there is no central personnel register. Battalions keep their own personnel records. Since funding is based on "roll book" strength it is not uncommon for units "roll book" strength to exceed on-hand strength.

<sup>101</sup>"Interview," 34-38. Also see Bacevich and Schwarz.

<sup>102</sup>Barraza, 285, Also see Garcia, 40; Rosello. 107; and Schwarz, 3.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid.

<sup>104</sup>Bacevich, 13.

<sup>105</sup>Stephen T. Hosmer, The Army's Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1990), 12-13.

<sup>106</sup>See Bacevich, 5; LaFeber, 314; and "Interview," 36.

<sup>107</sup>John D. Waghelstein, "El Salvador and the Press: A Personal Account," Parameters Vol. Xv No. 3 (Autumn 1985): 68-69.

<sup>108</sup>Bacevich, 13. Also see "Accountability for U.S. Military and Economic Aid."

<sup>109</sup>"Accountability for U.S. Military and Economic Aid," 10-22.

<sup>110</sup>See Schwarz, 18; Hosmer, 12-14; and Metz, Counterinsurgency, 16.

<sup>111</sup>Schwarz, 18.

<sup>112</sup>Hosmer, 12-13.

<sup>113</sup>See Schwarz, 19-22. Also see Baloyra-Herp El Salvador, 20-22; 90-96.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid.

<sup>116</sup>Rosello, 106.

<sup>117</sup>See Schwarz, 41; Montgomery, 173; Fishel, 38; Metz, Counterinsurgency, 17.

<sup>118</sup>Rosello, 104.

<sup>119</sup>Bacevich, 28-29.

<sup>120</sup>Ibid.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid., 24.

<sup>122</sup>Bacevich, 28, also see Adams, 296.

<sup>123</sup>Bacevich, 28.

<sup>124</sup>Rosello, 104. Also "Interview," 37.

<sup>125</sup>Whitehead, 347.

<sup>126</sup>Bacevich, 30.

<sup>127</sup>John D. Waghelstein, "Post-Vietnam Counterinsurgency Doctrine," Military Review Vol. LXV No. 5 (May 1985): 48-49. Also see Max G. Manwaring, "Toward an Understanding of Insurgent Warfare," Military Review Vol. LXVIII No. 1 (January 1988): 30-32, and Steven Metz, "Counterinsurgent Campaign Planning," Parameters Vol. XIX No. 3 (September 1989): 61.

<sup>128</sup>See previous references

<sup>129</sup>Bacevich, 24.

<sup>130</sup>See Waghelstein, "Post-Vietnam Counterinsurgency." Also see Manwaring and Metz, Counterinsurgency.

<sup>131</sup>Bacevich, 27-28; Schwarz, 20-22.

<sup>132</sup>Schwarz, 20-22.

<sup>133</sup>Barraza, 285; Garcia, 9.

<sup>134</sup>Ibid.

<sup>135</sup>Ibid.

<sup>136</sup>Rosello, 102.

<sup>137</sup>Ibid., 103.

<sup>138</sup>Ibid.

<sup>139</sup>Ibid. Also see "Interview," 35 and John R. Galvin, "Challenge and Response on the Southern Flank: Three Decades Later" Military Review Vol. LXVI No. 8 (August 1986): 15.

<sup>140</sup>Evans, "Lessons," 26-27 and Garcia, 41.

<sup>141</sup>Garcia, 40.

<sup>142</sup>Peter Winn, Americas: The Changing Face of Latin America and the Caribbean (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), 532. Also see Adams, 291 and Montgomery 5-6.

<sup>143</sup>Evans, "Lessons," 26.

<sup>144</sup>Ibid.

<sup>145</sup>Ernesto Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 2. For some interesting insights into this problem see Ernest Evans, "Electins During a Civil War: Problems of Interpretation," Conflict Quarterly Vol. III No. 3 (Spring 1983): 5-12.

<sup>146</sup>Winn, 6.

<sup>147</sup>Schwarz, xiii.

<sup>148</sup>Weaver, 241.

<sup>149</sup>Ibid.

- <sup>150</sup>Rosello, 107.
- <sup>151</sup>Metz, Counterinsurgency, 18.
- <sup>152</sup>Herring, 106.
- <sup>153</sup>Ibid.
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- <sup>155</sup>Accountability for U.S. Military and Economic Aid, 24.
- <sup>156</sup>Schwarz, 3.
- <sup>157</sup>Evans, "Lessons," 25.
- <sup>158</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>159</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>160</sup>Schwarz, xiii.
- <sup>161</sup>Garcia, 41.
- <sup>162</sup>Evans, "Lessons," 25.
- <sup>163</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>164</sup>Schwarz, 12.
- <sup>165</sup>Ibid., xii.
- <sup>166</sup>Carl von Clausewitz, On War trans and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.
- <sup>167</sup>Ibid.

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